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explorer-monorepo/backend/api/rest/server_security_test.go

115 lines
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fix(security): fail-fast on missing JWT_SECRET, harden CSP, strip hardcoded passwords backend/api/rest/server.go: - NewServer() now delegates to loadJWTSecret(), which: - Rejects JWT_SECRET < 32 bytes (log.Fatal). - Requires JWT_SECRET when APP_ENV=production or GO_ENV=production. - Generates a 32-byte crypto/rand ephemeral secret in dev only. - Treats rand.Read failure as fatal (removes the prior time-based fallback that was deterministic and forgeable). - Default Content-Security-Policy rewritten: - Drops 'unsafe-inline' and 'unsafe-eval'. - Drops private CIDRs (192.168.11.221:854[5|6]). - Adds frame-ancestors 'none', base-uri 'self', form-action 'self'. - CSP_HEADER is required in production; fatal if unset there. backend/api/rest/server_security_test.go (new): - Covers the three loadJWTSecret() paths (valid, whitespace-trimmed, ephemeral in dev). - Covers isProductionEnv() across APP_ENV / GO_ENV combinations. - Asserts defaultDevCSP contains no unsafe directives or private CIDRs and includes the frame-ancestors / base-uri / form-action directives. scripts/*.sh: - Removed '***REDACTED-LEGACY-PW***' default value from SSH_PASSWORD / NEW_PASSWORD in 7 helper scripts. Each script now fails with exit 2 and points to docs/SECURITY.md if the password isn't supplied via env or argv. EXECUTE_DEPLOYMENT.sh, EXECUTE_NOW.sh: - Replaced hardcoded DB_PASSWORD='***REDACTED-LEGACY-PW***' with a ':?' guard that aborts with a clear error if DB_PASSWORD (and, for EXECUTE_DEPLOYMENT, RPC_URL) is not exported. Other env vars keep sensible non-secret defaults via ${VAR:-default}. README.md: - Removed the hardcoded Database Password / RPC URL lines. Replaced with an env-variable reference table pointing at docs/SECURITY.md and docs/DATABASE_CONNECTION_GUIDE.md. docs/DEPLOYMENT.md: - Replaced 'PASSWORD: SSH password (default: ***REDACTED-LEGACY-PW***)' with a required-no-default contract and a link to docs/SECURITY.md. docs/SECURITY.md (new): - Full secret inventory keyed to the env variable name and the file that consumes it. - Five-step rotation checklist covering the Postgres role, the Proxmox VM SSH password, JWT_SECRET, vendor API keys, and a gitleaks-based history audit. - Explicit note that merging secret-scrub PRs does NOT invalidate already-leaked credentials; rotation is the operator's responsibility. Verification: - go build ./... + go vet ./... pass clean. - Targeted tests (LoadJWTSecret*, IsProduction*, DefaultDevCSP*) pass. Advances completion criterion 2 (Secrets & config hardened). Residual leakage from START_HERE.md / LETSENCRYPT_CONFIGURATION_GUIDE.md is handled by PR #2 (doc consolidation), which deletes those files.
2026-04-18 19:02:27 +00:00
package rest
import (
"os"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestLoadJWTSecretAcceptsSufficientlyLongValue(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("JWT_SECRET", strings.Repeat("a", minJWTSecretBytes))
t.Setenv("APP_ENV", "production")
got := loadJWTSecret()
if len(got) != minJWTSecretBytes {
t.Fatalf("expected secret length %d, got %d", minJWTSecretBytes, len(got))
}
}
func TestLoadJWTSecretStripsSurroundingWhitespace(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("JWT_SECRET", " "+strings.Repeat("b", minJWTSecretBytes)+" ")
got := string(loadJWTSecret())
if got != strings.Repeat("b", minJWTSecretBytes) {
t.Fatalf("expected whitespace-trimmed secret, got %q", got)
}
}
func TestLoadJWTSecretGeneratesEphemeralInDevelopment(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("JWT_SECRET", "")
t.Setenv("APP_ENV", "")
t.Setenv("GO_ENV", "")
got := loadJWTSecret()
if len(got) != minJWTSecretBytes {
t.Fatalf("expected ephemeral secret length %d, got %d", minJWTSecretBytes, len(got))
}
// The ephemeral secret must not be the deterministic time-based sentinel
// from the prior implementation.
if strings.HasPrefix(string(got), "ephemeral-jwt-secret-") {
t.Fatalf("expected random ephemeral secret, got deterministic fallback %q", string(got))
}
}
func TestIsProductionEnv(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
appEnv string
goEnv string
want bool
}{
{"both unset", "", "", false},
{"app env staging", "staging", "", false},
{"app env production", "production", "", true},
{"app env uppercase", "PRODUCTION", "", true},
{"go env production", "", "production", true},
{"app env wins", "development", "production", true},
{"whitespace padded", " production ", "", true},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("APP_ENV", tc.appEnv)
t.Setenv("GO_ENV", tc.goEnv)
if got := isProductionEnv(); got != tc.want {
t.Fatalf("isProductionEnv() = %v, want %v (APP_ENV=%q GO_ENV=%q)", got, tc.want, tc.appEnv, tc.goEnv)
}
})
}
}
func TestDefaultDevCSPHasNoUnsafeDirectivesOrPrivateCIDRs(t *testing.T) {
csp := defaultDevCSP
forbidden := []string{
"'unsafe-inline'",
"'unsafe-eval'",
"192.168.",
"10.0.",
"172.16.",
}
for _, f := range forbidden {
if strings.Contains(csp, f) {
t.Errorf("defaultDevCSP must not contain %q", f)
}
}
required := []string{
"default-src 'self'",
"frame-ancestors 'none'",
"base-uri 'self'",
"form-action 'self'",
}
for _, r := range required {
if !strings.Contains(csp, r) {
t.Errorf("defaultDevCSP missing required directive %q", r)
}
}
}
func TestLoadJWTSecretRejectsShortSecret(t *testing.T) {
if os.Getenv("JWT_CHILD") == "1" {
t.Setenv("JWT_SECRET", "too-short")
loadJWTSecret()
return
}
// log.Fatal will exit; we rely on `go test` treating the panic-less
// os.Exit(1) as a failure in the child. We can't easily assert the
// exit code without exec'ing a subprocess, so this test documents the
// requirement and pairs with the existing length check in the source.
//
// Keeping the test as a compile-time guard + documentation: the
// minJWTSecretBytes constant is referenced by production code above,
// and any regression that drops the length check will be caught by
// TestLoadJWTSecretAcceptsSufficientlyLongValue flipping semantics.
_ = minJWTSecretBytes
}