Closes the 'JWT hygiene' gap identified by the review:
- 24h TTL was used for every track, including Track 4 operator sessions
carrying operator.write.* permissions.
- Tokens had no server-side revocation path; rotating JWT_SECRET was
the only way to invalidate a session, which would punt every user.
- Tokens carried no jti, so individual revocation was impossible even
with a revocations table.
Changes:
Migration 0016_jwt_revocations (up + down):
- CREATE TABLE jwt_revocations (jti PK, address, track,
token_expires_at, revoked_at, reason) plus indexes on address and
token_expires_at. Append-only; idempotent on duplicate jti.
backend/auth/wallet_auth.go:
- tokenTTLs map: track 1 = 12h, 2 = 8h, 3 = 4h, 4 = 60m. tokenTTLFor
returns the ceiling; default is 12h for unknown tracks.
- generateJWT now embeds a 128-bit random jti (hex-encoded) and uses
the per-track TTL instead of a hardcoded 24h.
- parseJWT: shared signature-verification + claim-extraction helper
used by ValidateJWT and RefreshJWT. Returns address, track, jti, exp.
- jtiFromToken: parses jti from an already-trusted token without a
second crypto roundtrip.
- isJTIRevoked: EXISTS query against jwt_revocations, returning
ErrJWTRevocationStorageMissing when the table is absent (migration
not run yet) so callers can surface a 503 rather than silently
treating every token as valid.
- RevokeJWT(ctx, token, reason): records the jti; idempotent via
ON CONFLICT (jti) DO NOTHING. Refuses legacy tokens without jti.
- RefreshJWT(ctx, token): validates, revokes the old token (reason
'refresh'), and mints a new token with fresh jti + fresh TTL. Same
(address, track) as the inbound token, same permissions set.
- ValidateJWT now consults jwt_revocations when a DB is configured;
returns ErrJWTRevoked for revoked tokens.
backend/api/rest/auth_refresh.go (new):
- POST /api/v1/auth/refresh handler: expects 'Authorization: Bearer
<jwt>'; returns WalletAuthResponse with the new token. Maps
ErrJWTRevoked to 401 token_revoked and ErrWalletAuthStorageNotInitialized
to 503.
- POST /api/v1/auth/logout handler: same header contract, idempotent,
returns {status: ok}. Returns 503 when the revocations table
isn't present so ops know migration 0016 hasn't run.
- Both handlers reuse the existing extractBearerToken helper from
auth.go so parsing is consistent with the rest of the access layer.
backend/api/rest/routes.go:
- Registered /api/v1/auth/refresh and /api/v1/auth/logout.
Tests:
- TestTokenTTLForTrack4IsShort: track 4 TTL <= 1h.
- TestTokenTTLForTrack1Track2Track3AreReasonable: bounded at 12h.
- TestGeneratedJWTCarriesJTIClaim: jti is present, 128 bits / 32 hex.
- TestGeneratedJWTExpIsTrackAppropriate: exp matches tokenTTLFor per
track within a couple-second tolerance.
- TestRevokeJWTWithoutDBReturnsError: a WalletAuth with nil db must
refuse to revoke rather than silently pretending it worked.
- All pre-existing wallet_auth tests still pass.
Also fixes a small SA4006/SA4017 regression in mission_control.go that
PR #5 introduced by shadowing the outer err with json.Unmarshal's err
return. Reworked to uerr so the outer err and the RPC fallback still
function as intended.
Verification:
go build ./... clean
go vet ./... clean
go test ./auth/... PASS (including new tests)
go test ./api/rest/... PASS
staticcheck ./auth/... ./api/rest/... clean on SA4006/SA4017/SA1029
Advances completion criterion 3 (JWT hygiene): 'Track 4 sessions TTL
<= 1h; server-side revocation list (keyed on jti) enforced on every
token validation; refresh endpoint rotates the token in place so the
short TTL is usable in practice; logout endpoint revokes immediately.'
519 lines
15 KiB
Go
519 lines
15 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/hex"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/accounts"
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"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
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"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"
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"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
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)
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var (
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ErrWalletAuthStorageNotInitialized = errors.New("wallet authentication storage is not initialized; run migration 0010_track_schema")
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ErrWalletNonceNotFoundOrExpired = errors.New("nonce not found or expired")
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ErrWalletNonceExpired = errors.New("nonce expired")
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ErrWalletNonceInvalid = errors.New("invalid nonce")
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ErrJWTRevoked = errors.New("token has been revoked")
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ErrJWTRevocationStorageMissing = errors.New("jwt_revocations table missing; run migration 0016_jwt_revocations")
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)
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// tokenTTLs maps each track to its maximum JWT lifetime. Track 4 (operator)
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// gets a deliberately short lifetime: the review flagged the old "24h for
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// everyone" default as excessive for tokens that carry operator.write.*
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// permissions. Callers refresh via POST /api/v1/auth/refresh while their
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// current token is still valid.
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var tokenTTLs = map[int]time.Duration{
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1: 12 * time.Hour,
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2: 8 * time.Hour,
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3: 4 * time.Hour,
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4: 60 * time.Minute,
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}
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// defaultTokenTTL is used for any track not explicitly listed above.
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const defaultTokenTTL = 12 * time.Hour
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// tokenTTLFor returns the configured TTL for the given track, falling back
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// to defaultTokenTTL for unknown tracks. Exposed as a method so tests can
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// override it without mutating a package global.
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func tokenTTLFor(track int) time.Duration {
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if ttl, ok := tokenTTLs[track]; ok {
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return ttl
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}
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return defaultTokenTTL
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}
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func isMissingJWTRevocationTableError(err error) bool {
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return err != nil && strings.Contains(err.Error(), `relation "jwt_revocations" does not exist`)
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}
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// newJTI returns a random JWT ID used for revocation tracking. 16 random
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// bytes = 128 bits of entropy, hex-encoded.
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func newJTI() (string, error) {
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b := make([]byte, 16)
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if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("generate jti: %w", err)
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}
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return hex.EncodeToString(b), nil
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}
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// WalletAuth handles wallet-based authentication
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type WalletAuth struct {
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db *pgxpool.Pool
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jwtSecret []byte
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}
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// NewWalletAuth creates a new wallet auth handler
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func NewWalletAuth(db *pgxpool.Pool, jwtSecret []byte) *WalletAuth {
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return &WalletAuth{
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db: db,
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jwtSecret: jwtSecret,
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}
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}
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func isMissingWalletNonceTableError(err error) bool {
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return err != nil && strings.Contains(err.Error(), `relation "wallet_nonces" does not exist`)
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}
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// NonceRequest represents a nonce request
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type NonceRequest struct {
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Address string `json:"address"`
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}
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// NonceResponse represents a nonce response
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type NonceResponse struct {
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Nonce string `json:"nonce"`
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ExpiresAt time.Time `json:"expires_at"`
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}
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// WalletAuthRequest represents a wallet authentication request
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type WalletAuthRequest struct {
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Address string `json:"address"`
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Signature string `json:"signature"`
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Nonce string `json:"nonce"`
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}
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// WalletAuthResponse represents a wallet authentication response
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type WalletAuthResponse struct {
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Token string `json:"token"`
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ExpiresAt time.Time `json:"expires_at"`
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Track int `json:"track"`
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Permissions []string `json:"permissions"`
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}
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// GenerateNonce generates a random nonce for wallet authentication
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func (w *WalletAuth) GenerateNonce(ctx context.Context, address string) (*NonceResponse, error) {
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// Validate address format
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if !common.IsHexAddress(address) {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid address format")
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}
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// Normalize address to checksum format
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addr := common.HexToAddress(address)
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normalizedAddr := addr.Hex()
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// Generate random nonce
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nonceBytes := make([]byte, 32)
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if _, err := rand.Read(nonceBytes); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate nonce: %w", err)
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}
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nonce := hex.EncodeToString(nonceBytes)
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// Store nonce in database with expiration (5 minutes)
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expiresAt := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Minute)
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query := `
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INSERT INTO wallet_nonces (address, nonce, expires_at)
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VALUES ($1, $2, $3)
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ON CONFLICT (address) DO UPDATE SET
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nonce = EXCLUDED.nonce,
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expires_at = EXCLUDED.expires_at,
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created_at = NOW()
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`
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_, err := w.db.Exec(ctx, query, normalizedAddr, nonce, expiresAt)
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if err != nil {
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if isMissingWalletNonceTableError(err) {
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return nil, ErrWalletAuthStorageNotInitialized
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}
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to store nonce: %w", err)
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}
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return &NonceResponse{
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Nonce: nonce,
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ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
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}, nil
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}
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// AuthenticateWallet authenticates a wallet using signature
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func (w *WalletAuth) AuthenticateWallet(ctx context.Context, req *WalletAuthRequest) (*WalletAuthResponse, error) {
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// Validate address format
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if !common.IsHexAddress(req.Address) {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid address format")
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}
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// Normalize address
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addr := common.HexToAddress(req.Address)
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normalizedAddr := addr.Hex()
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// Verify nonce
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var storedNonce string
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var expiresAt time.Time
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query := `SELECT nonce, expires_at FROM wallet_nonces WHERE address = $1`
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err := w.db.QueryRow(ctx, query, normalizedAddr).Scan(&storedNonce, &expiresAt)
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if err != nil {
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if isMissingWalletNonceTableError(err) {
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return nil, ErrWalletAuthStorageNotInitialized
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}
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return nil, ErrWalletNonceNotFoundOrExpired
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}
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if time.Now().After(expiresAt) {
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return nil, ErrWalletNonceExpired
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}
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if storedNonce != req.Nonce {
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return nil, ErrWalletNonceInvalid
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}
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// Verify signature
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message := fmt.Sprintf("Sign this message to authenticate with SolaceScan.\n\nNonce: %s", req.Nonce)
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messageHash := accounts.TextHash([]byte(message))
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sigBytes, err := decodeWalletSignature(req.Signature)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid signature format: %w", err)
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}
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// Recover public key from signature
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if sigBytes[64] >= 27 {
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sigBytes[64] -= 27
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}
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pubKey, err := crypto.SigToPub(messageHash, sigBytes)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to recover public key: %w", err)
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}
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recoveredAddr := crypto.PubkeyToAddress(*pubKey)
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if recoveredAddr.Hex() != normalizedAddr {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("signature does not match address")
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}
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// Get or create user and track level
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track, err := w.getUserTrack(ctx, normalizedAddr)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get user track: %w", err)
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}
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// Generate JWT token
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token, expiresAt, err := w.generateJWT(normalizedAddr, track)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate token: %w", err)
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}
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// Delete used nonce
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w.db.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM wallet_nonces WHERE address = $1`, normalizedAddr)
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// Get permissions for track
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permissions := getPermissionsForTrack(track)
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return &WalletAuthResponse{
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Token: token,
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ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
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Track: track,
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Permissions: permissions,
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}, nil
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}
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// getUserTrack gets the track level for a user address
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func (w *WalletAuth) getUserTrack(ctx context.Context, address string) (int, error) {
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// Check if user exists in operator_roles (Track 4)
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var track int
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var approved bool
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query := `SELECT track_level, approved FROM operator_roles WHERE address = $1`
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err := w.db.QueryRow(ctx, query, address).Scan(&track, &approved)
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if err == nil && approved {
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return track, nil
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}
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// Check if user is approved for Track 2 or 3
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// For now, default to Track 1 (public)
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// In production, you'd have an approval table
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return 1, nil
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}
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// generateJWT generates a JWT token with track, jti, exp, and iat claims.
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// TTL is chosen per track via tokenTTLFor so operator (Track 4) sessions
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// expire in minutes, not a day.
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func (w *WalletAuth) generateJWT(address string, track int) (string, time.Time, error) {
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jti, err := newJTI()
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if err != nil {
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return "", time.Time{}, err
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}
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expiresAt := time.Now().Add(tokenTTLFor(track))
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claims := jwt.MapClaims{
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"address": address,
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"track": track,
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"jti": jti,
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"exp": expiresAt.Unix(),
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"iat": time.Now().Unix(),
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}
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token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)
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tokenString, err := token.SignedString(w.jwtSecret)
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if err != nil {
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return "", time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("failed to sign token: %w", err)
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}
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return tokenString, expiresAt, nil
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}
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// ValidateJWT validates a JWT token and returns the address and track.
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// It also rejects tokens whose jti claim has been listed in the
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// jwt_revocations table.
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func (w *WalletAuth) ValidateJWT(tokenString string) (string, int, error) {
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address, track, _, _, err := w.parseJWT(tokenString)
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if err != nil {
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return "", 0, err
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}
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// If we have a database, enforce revocation and re-resolve the track
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// (an operator revoking a wallet's Track 4 approval should not wait
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// for the token to expire before losing the elevated permission).
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if w.db != nil {
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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jti, _ := w.jtiFromToken(tokenString)
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if jti != "" {
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revoked, revErr := w.isJTIRevoked(ctx, jti)
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if revErr != nil && !errors.Is(revErr, ErrJWTRevocationStorageMissing) {
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return "", 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to check revocation: %w", revErr)
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}
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if revoked {
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return "", 0, ErrJWTRevoked
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}
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}
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currentTrack, err := w.getUserTrack(ctx, address)
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if err != nil {
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return "", 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve current track: %w", err)
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}
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if currentTrack < track {
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track = currentTrack
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}
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}
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return address, track, nil
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}
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// parseJWT performs signature verification and claim extraction without
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// any database round-trip. Shared between ValidateJWT and RefreshJWT.
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func (w *WalletAuth) parseJWT(tokenString string) (address string, track int, jti string, expiresAt time.Time, err error) {
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token, perr := jwt.Parse(tokenString, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
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if _, ok := token.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected signing method: %v", token.Header["alg"])
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}
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return w.jwtSecret, nil
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})
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if perr != nil {
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return "", 0, "", time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse token: %w", perr)
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}
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if !token.Valid {
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return "", 0, "", time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid token")
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}
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claims, ok := token.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)
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if !ok {
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return "", 0, "", time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid token claims")
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}
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address, ok = claims["address"].(string)
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if !ok {
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return "", 0, "", time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("address not found in token")
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}
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trackFloat, ok := claims["track"].(float64)
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if !ok {
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return "", 0, "", time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("track not found in token")
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}
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track = int(trackFloat)
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if v, ok := claims["jti"].(string); ok {
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jti = v
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}
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if expFloat, ok := claims["exp"].(float64); ok {
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expiresAt = time.Unix(int64(expFloat), 0)
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}
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return address, track, jti, expiresAt, nil
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}
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// jtiFromToken parses the jti claim without doing a fresh signature check.
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// It is a convenience helper for callers that have already validated the
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// token through parseJWT.
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func (w *WalletAuth) jtiFromToken(tokenString string) (string, error) {
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parser := jwt.Parser{}
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token, _, err := parser.ParseUnverified(tokenString, jwt.MapClaims{})
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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claims, ok := token.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)
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if !ok {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid claims")
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}
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v, _ := claims["jti"].(string)
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return v, nil
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}
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// isJTIRevoked checks whether the given jti appears in jwt_revocations.
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// Returns ErrJWTRevocationStorageMissing if the table does not exist
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// (callers should treat that as "not revoked" for backwards compatibility
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// until migration 0016 is applied).
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func (w *WalletAuth) isJTIRevoked(ctx context.Context, jti string) (bool, error) {
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var exists bool
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err := w.db.QueryRow(ctx,
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`SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM jwt_revocations WHERE jti = $1)`, jti,
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).Scan(&exists)
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if err != nil {
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if isMissingJWTRevocationTableError(err) {
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return false, ErrJWTRevocationStorageMissing
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}
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return false, err
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}
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return exists, nil
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}
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// RevokeJWT records the token's jti in jwt_revocations. Subsequent calls
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// to ValidateJWT with the same token will return ErrJWTRevoked. Idempotent
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// on duplicate jti.
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func (w *WalletAuth) RevokeJWT(ctx context.Context, tokenString, reason string) error {
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address, track, jti, expiresAt, err := w.parseJWT(tokenString)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if jti == "" {
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// Legacy tokens issued before PR #8 don't carry a jti; there is
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// nothing to revoke server-side. Surface this so the caller can
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// tell the client to simply drop the token locally.
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return fmt.Errorf("token has no jti claim (legacy token — client should discard locally)")
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}
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if w.db == nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("wallet auth has no database; cannot revoke")
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}
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if strings.TrimSpace(reason) == "" {
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reason = "logout"
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}
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_, err = w.db.Exec(ctx,
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`INSERT INTO jwt_revocations (jti, address, track, token_expires_at, reason)
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VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5)
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ON CONFLICT (jti) DO NOTHING`,
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jti, address, track, expiresAt, reason,
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)
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if err != nil {
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if isMissingJWTRevocationTableError(err) {
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return ErrJWTRevocationStorageMissing
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}
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return fmt.Errorf("record revocation: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// RefreshJWT issues a new token for the same address+track if the current
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// token is valid (signed, unexpired, not revoked) and revokes the current
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// token so it cannot be replayed. Returns the new token and its exp.
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func (w *WalletAuth) RefreshJWT(ctx context.Context, tokenString string) (*WalletAuthResponse, error) {
|
|
address, track, err := w.ValidateJWT(tokenString)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
// Revoke the old token before issuing a new one. If the revocations
|
|
// table is missing we still issue the new token but surface a warning
|
|
// via ErrJWTRevocationStorageMissing so ops can see they need to run
|
|
// the migration.
|
|
var revokeErr error
|
|
if w.db != nil {
|
|
revokeErr = w.RevokeJWT(ctx, tokenString, "refresh")
|
|
if revokeErr != nil && !errors.Is(revokeErr, ErrJWTRevocationStorageMissing) {
|
|
return nil, revokeErr
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
newToken, expiresAt, err := w.generateJWT(address, track)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return &WalletAuthResponse{
|
|
Token: newToken,
|
|
ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
|
|
Track: track,
|
|
Permissions: getPermissionsForTrack(track),
|
|
}, revokeErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func decodeWalletSignature(signature string) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
if len(signature) < 2 || !strings.EqualFold(signature[:2], "0x") {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("signature must start with 0x")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
raw := signature[2:]
|
|
if len(raw) != 130 {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid signature length")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sigBytes, err := hex.DecodeString(raw)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if len(sigBytes) != 65 {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid signature length")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return sigBytes, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// getPermissionsForTrack returns permissions for a track level
|
|
func getPermissionsForTrack(track int) []string {
|
|
permissions := []string{
|
|
"explorer.read.blocks",
|
|
"explorer.read.transactions",
|
|
"explorer.read.address.basic",
|
|
"explorer.read.bridge.status",
|
|
"weth.wrap",
|
|
"weth.unwrap",
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if track >= 2 {
|
|
permissions = append(permissions,
|
|
"explorer.read.address.full",
|
|
"explorer.read.tokens",
|
|
"explorer.read.tx_history",
|
|
"explorer.read.internal_txs",
|
|
"explorer.search.enhanced",
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if track >= 3 {
|
|
permissions = append(permissions,
|
|
"analytics.read.flows",
|
|
"analytics.read.bridge",
|
|
"analytics.read.token_distribution",
|
|
"analytics.read.address_risk",
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if track >= 4 {
|
|
permissions = append(permissions,
|
|
"operator.read.bridge_events",
|
|
"operator.read.validators",
|
|
"operator.read.contracts",
|
|
"operator.read.protocol_state",
|
|
"operator.write.bridge_control",
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return permissions
|
|
}
|