Devin
29fe704f3c
Closes the 'JWT hygiene' gap identified by the review:
- 24h TTL was used for every track, including Track 4 operator sessions
carrying operator.write.* permissions.
- Tokens had no server-side revocation path; rotating JWT_SECRET was
the only way to invalidate a session, which would punt every user.
- Tokens carried no jti, so individual revocation was impossible even
with a revocations table.
Changes:
Migration 0016_jwt_revocations (up + down):
- CREATE TABLE jwt_revocations (jti PK, address, track,
token_expires_at, revoked_at, reason) plus indexes on address and
token_expires_at. Append-only; idempotent on duplicate jti.
backend/auth/wallet_auth.go:
- tokenTTLs map: track 1 = 12h, 2 = 8h, 3 = 4h, 4 = 60m. tokenTTLFor
returns the ceiling; default is 12h for unknown tracks.
- generateJWT now embeds a 128-bit random jti (hex-encoded) and uses
the per-track TTL instead of a hardcoded 24h.
- parseJWT: shared signature-verification + claim-extraction helper
used by ValidateJWT and RefreshJWT. Returns address, track, jti, exp.
- jtiFromToken: parses jti from an already-trusted token without a
second crypto roundtrip.
- isJTIRevoked: EXISTS query against jwt_revocations, returning
ErrJWTRevocationStorageMissing when the table is absent (migration
not run yet) so callers can surface a 503 rather than silently
treating every token as valid.
- RevokeJWT(ctx, token, reason): records the jti; idempotent via
ON CONFLICT (jti) DO NOTHING. Refuses legacy tokens without jti.
- RefreshJWT(ctx, token): validates, revokes the old token (reason
'refresh'), and mints a new token with fresh jti + fresh TTL. Same
(address, track) as the inbound token, same permissions set.
- ValidateJWT now consults jwt_revocations when a DB is configured;
returns ErrJWTRevoked for revoked tokens.
backend/api/rest/auth_refresh.go (new):
- POST /api/v1/auth/refresh handler: expects 'Authorization: Bearer
<jwt>'; returns WalletAuthResponse with the new token. Maps
ErrJWTRevoked to 401 token_revoked and ErrWalletAuthStorageNotInitialized
to 503.
- POST /api/v1/auth/logout handler: same header contract, idempotent,
returns {status: ok}. Returns 503 when the revocations table
isn't present so ops know migration 0016 hasn't run.
- Both handlers reuse the existing extractBearerToken helper from
auth.go so parsing is consistent with the rest of the access layer.
backend/api/rest/routes.go:
- Registered /api/v1/auth/refresh and /api/v1/auth/logout.
Tests:
- TestTokenTTLForTrack4IsShort: track 4 TTL <= 1h.
- TestTokenTTLForTrack1Track2Track3AreReasonable: bounded at 12h.
- TestGeneratedJWTCarriesJTIClaim: jti is present, 128 bits / 32 hex.
- TestGeneratedJWTExpIsTrackAppropriate: exp matches tokenTTLFor per
track within a couple-second tolerance.
- TestRevokeJWTWithoutDBReturnsError: a WalletAuth with nil db must
refuse to revoke rather than silently pretending it worked.
- All pre-existing wallet_auth tests still pass.
Also fixes a small SA4006/SA4017 regression in mission_control.go that
PR #5 introduced by shadowing the outer err with json.Unmarshal's err
return. Reworked to uerr so the outer err and the RPC fallback still
function as intended.
Verification:
go build ./... clean
go vet ./... clean
go test ./auth/... PASS (including new tests)
go test ./api/rest/... PASS
staticcheck ./auth/... ./api/rest/... clean on SA4006/SA4017/SA1029
Advances completion criterion 3 (JWT hygiene): 'Track 4 sessions TTL
<= 1h; server-side revocation list (keyed on jti) enforced on every
token validation; refresh endpoint rotates the token in place so the
short TTL is usable in practice; logout endpoint revokes immediately.'
31 lines
1.2 KiB
SQL
31 lines
1.2 KiB
SQL
-- Migration 0016_jwt_revocations.up.sql
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--
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-- Introduces server-side JWT revocation for the SolaceScan backend.
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--
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-- Up to this migration, tokens issued by /api/v1/auth/wallet were simply
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-- signed and returned; the backend had no way to invalidate a token before
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-- its exp claim short of rotating the JWT_SECRET (which would invalidate
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-- every outstanding session). PR #8 introduces per-token revocation keyed
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-- on the `jti` claim.
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--
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-- The table is append-only: a row exists iff that jti has been revoked.
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-- ValidateJWT consults the table on every request; the primary key on
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-- (jti) keeps lookups O(log n) and deduplicates repeated logout calls.
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS jwt_revocations (
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jti TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
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address TEXT NOT NULL,
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track INT NOT NULL,
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-- original exp of the revoked token, so a background janitor can
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-- reap rows after they can no longer matter.
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token_expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
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revoked_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
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reason TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'logout'
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);
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CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_jwt_revocations_address
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ON jwt_revocations (address);
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CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_jwt_revocations_expires
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ON jwt_revocations (token_expires_at);
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