EXECUTE_DEPLOYMENT.sh

@@ -9,14 +9,16 @@ echo "  SolaceScan Deployment"
 echo "=========================================="
 echo ""
 
-# Configuration
-DB_PASSWORD='L@ker$2010'
-DB_HOST='localhost'
-DB_USER='explorer'
-DB_NAME='explorer'
-RPC_URL='http://192.168.11.250:8545'
-CHAIN_ID=138
-PORT=8080
+# Configuration. All secrets MUST be provided via environment variables; no
+# credentials are committed to this repo. See docs/SECURITY.md for the
+# rotation checklist.
+: "${DB_PASSWORD:?DB_PASSWORD is required (export it or source your secrets file)}"
+DB_HOST="${DB_HOST:-localhost}"
+DB_USER="${DB_USER:-explorer}"
+DB_NAME="${DB_NAME:-explorer}"
+RPC_URL="${RPC_URL:?RPC_URL is required}"
+CHAIN_ID="${CHAIN_ID:-138}"
+PORT="${PORT:-8080}"
 
 # Step 1: Test database connection
 echo "[1/6] Testing database connection..."

EXECUTE_NOW.sh

@@ -8,11 +8,13 @@ cd "$(dirname "$0")"
 echo "=== Complete Deployment Execution ==="
 echo ""
 
-# Database credentials
-export DB_PASSWORD='L@ker$2010'
-export DB_HOST='localhost'
-export DB_USER='explorer'
-export DB_NAME='explorer'
+# Database credentials. DB_PASSWORD MUST be provided via environment; no
+# secrets are committed to this repo. See docs/SECURITY.md.
+: "${DB_PASSWORD:?DB_PASSWORD is required (export it before running this script)}"
+export DB_PASSWORD
+export DB_HOST="${DB_HOST:-localhost}"
+export DB_USER="${DB_USER:-explorer}"
+export DB_NAME="${DB_NAME:-explorer}"
 
 # Step 1: Test database
 echo "Step 1: Testing database connection..."

README.md

@@ -52,11 +52,23 @@ If the script doesn't work, see `START_HERE.md` for step-by-step manual commands
 
 ## Configuration
 
-- **Database User:** `explorer`
-- **Database Password:** `L@ker$2010`
-- **RPC URL:** `http://192.168.11.250:8545`
-- **Chain ID:** `138`
-- **Port:** `8080`
+All secrets and environment-specific endpoints are read from environment
+variables — nothing is committed to this repo. See
+[docs/SECURITY.md](docs/SECURITY.md) for the rotation checklist and
+[docs/DATABASE_CONNECTION_GUIDE.md](docs/DATABASE_CONNECTION_GUIDE.md) for
+setup.
+
+| Variable | Purpose | Example |
+|---|---|---|
+| `DB_USER` | Postgres role | `explorer` |
+| `DB_PASSWORD` | Postgres password (required, no default) | — |
+| `DB_HOST` | Postgres host | `localhost` |
+| `DB_NAME` | Database name | `explorer` |
+| `RPC_URL` | Besu / execution client RPC endpoint | `http://rpc.internal:8545` |
+| `CHAIN_ID` | EVM chain ID | `138` |
+| `PORT` | API listen port | `8080` |
+| `JWT_SECRET` | HS256 signing key (≥32 bytes, required in prod) | — |
+| `CSP_HEADER` | Content-Security-Policy header (required in prod) | — |
 
 ## Reusable libs (extraction)
 

backend/api/rest/server.go

@@ -29,15 +29,42 @@ type Server struct {
 	aiMetrics  *AIMetrics
 }
 
-// NewServer creates a new REST API server
-func NewServer(db *pgxpool.Pool, chainID int) *Server {
-	// Get JWT secret from environment or generate an ephemeral secret.
-	jwtSecret := []byte(os.Getenv("JWT_SECRET"))
-	if len(jwtSecret) == 0 {
-		jwtSecret = generateEphemeralJWTSecret()
-		log.Println("WARNING: JWT_SECRET is unset. Using an ephemeral in-memory secret; wallet auth tokens will be invalid after restart.")
-	}
+// minJWTSecretBytes is the minimum allowed length for an operator-provided
+// JWT signing secret. 32 random bytes = 256 bits, matching HS256's output.
+const minJWTSecretBytes = 32
 
+// defaultDevCSP is the Content-Security-Policy used when CSP_HEADER is unset
+// and the server is running outside production. It keeps script/style sources
+// restricted to 'self' plus the public CDNs the frontend actually pulls from;
+// it does NOT include 'unsafe-inline', 'unsafe-eval', or any private CIDRs.
+// Production deployments MUST provide an explicit CSP_HEADER.
+const defaultDevCSP = "default-src 'self'; " +
+	"script-src 'self' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net https://unpkg.com https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com; " +
+	"style-src 'self' https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com; " +
+	"font-src 'self' https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com; " +
+	"img-src 'self' data: https:; " +
+	"connect-src 'self' https://blockscout.defi-oracle.io https://explorer.d-bis.org https://rpc-http-pub.d-bis.org wss://rpc-ws-pub.d-bis.org; " +
+	"frame-ancestors 'none'; " +
+	"base-uri 'self'; " +
+	"form-action 'self';"
+
+// isProductionEnv reports whether the server is running in production mode.
+// Production is signalled by APP_ENV=production or GO_ENV=production.
+func isProductionEnv() bool {
+	for _, key := range []string{"APP_ENV", "GO_ENV"} {
+		if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(key)), "production") {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// NewServer creates a new REST API server.
+//
+// Fails fatally if JWT_SECRET is missing or too short in production mode,
+// and if crypto/rand is unavailable when an ephemeral dev secret is needed.
+func NewServer(db *pgxpool.Pool, chainID int) *Server {
+	jwtSecret := loadJWTSecret()
 	walletAuth := auth.NewWalletAuth(db, jwtSecret)
 
 	return &Server{
@@ -51,15 +78,32 @@ func NewServer(db *pgxpool.Pool, chainID int) *Server {
 	}
 }
 
-func generateEphemeralJWTSecret() []byte {
-	secret := make([]byte, 32)
-	if _, err := rand.Read(secret); err == nil {
-		return secret
+// loadJWTSecret reads the signing secret from $JWT_SECRET. In production, a
+// missing or undersized secret is a fatal configuration error. In non-prod
+// environments a random 32-byte ephemeral secret is generated; a crypto/rand
+// failure is still fatal (no predictable fallback).
+func loadJWTSecret() []byte {
+	raw := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("JWT_SECRET"))
+	if raw != "" {
+		if len(raw) < minJWTSecretBytes {
+			log.Fatalf("JWT_SECRET must be at least %d bytes (got %d); refusing to start with a weak signing key",
+				minJWTSecretBytes, len(raw))
+		}
+		return []byte(raw)
 	}
 
-	fallback := []byte(fmt.Sprintf("ephemeral-jwt-secret-%d", time.Now().UnixNano()))
-	log.Println("WARNING: crypto/rand failed while generating JWT secret; using time-based fallback secret.")
-	return fallback
+	if isProductionEnv() {
+		log.Fatal("JWT_SECRET is required in production (APP_ENV=production or GO_ENV=production); refusing to start")
+	}
+
+	secret := make([]byte, minJWTSecretBytes)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(secret); err != nil {
+		log.Fatalf("failed to generate ephemeral JWT secret: %v", err)
+	}
+	log.Printf("WARNING: JWT_SECRET is unset; generated a %d-byte ephemeral secret for this process. "+
+		"All wallet auth tokens become invalid on restart and cannot be validated by another replica. "+
+		"Set JWT_SECRET for any deployment beyond a single-process development run.", minJWTSecretBytes)
+	return secret
 }
 
 // Start starts the HTTP server
@@ -73,10 +117,15 @@ func (s *Server) Start(port int) error {
 	// Setup track routes with proper middleware
 	s.SetupTrackRoutes(mux, authMiddleware)
 
-	// Security headers (reusable lib; CSP from env or explorer default)
-	csp := os.Getenv("CSP_HEADER")
+	// Security headers. CSP is env-configurable; the default is intentionally
+	// strict (no unsafe-inline / unsafe-eval, no private CIDRs). Operators who
+	// need third-party script/style sources must opt in via CSP_HEADER.
+	csp := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("CSP_HEADER"))
 	if csp == "" {
-		csp = "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net https://unpkg.com https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com; font-src 'self' https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com; img-src 'self' data: https:; connect-src 'self' https://blockscout.defi-oracle.io https://explorer.d-bis.org https://rpc-http-pub.d-bis.org wss://rpc-ws-pub.d-bis.org http://192.168.11.221:8545 ws://192.168.11.221:8546;"
+		if isProductionEnv() {
+			log.Fatal("CSP_HEADER is required in production; refusing to fall back to a permissive default")
+		}
+		csp = defaultDevCSP
 	}
 	securityMiddleware := httpmiddleware.NewSecurity(csp)
 

backend/api/rest/server_security_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+package rest
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestLoadJWTSecretAcceptsSufficientlyLongValue(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("JWT_SECRET", strings.Repeat("a", minJWTSecretBytes))
+	t.Setenv("APP_ENV", "production")
+
+	got := loadJWTSecret()
+	if len(got) != minJWTSecretBytes {
+		t.Fatalf("expected secret length %d, got %d", minJWTSecretBytes, len(got))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadJWTSecretStripsSurroundingWhitespace(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("JWT_SECRET", "  "+strings.Repeat("b", minJWTSecretBytes)+"  ")
+	got := string(loadJWTSecret())
+	if got != strings.Repeat("b", minJWTSecretBytes) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected whitespace-trimmed secret, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadJWTSecretGeneratesEphemeralInDevelopment(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("JWT_SECRET", "")
+	t.Setenv("APP_ENV", "")
+	t.Setenv("GO_ENV", "")
+
+	got := loadJWTSecret()
+	if len(got) != minJWTSecretBytes {
+		t.Fatalf("expected ephemeral secret length %d, got %d", minJWTSecretBytes, len(got))
+	}
+	// The ephemeral secret must not be the deterministic time-based sentinel
+	// from the prior implementation.
+	if strings.HasPrefix(string(got), "ephemeral-jwt-secret-") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected random ephemeral secret, got deterministic fallback %q", string(got))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIsProductionEnv(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name    string
+		appEnv  string
+		goEnv   string
+		want    bool
+	}{
+		{"both unset", "", "", false},
+		{"app env staging", "staging", "", false},
+		{"app env production", "production", "", true},
+		{"app env uppercase", "PRODUCTION", "", true},
+		{"go env production", "", "production", true},
+		{"app env wins", "development", "production", true},
+		{"whitespace padded", "  production  ", "", true},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Setenv("APP_ENV", tc.appEnv)
+			t.Setenv("GO_ENV", tc.goEnv)
+			if got := isProductionEnv(); got != tc.want {
+				t.Fatalf("isProductionEnv() = %v, want %v (APP_ENV=%q GO_ENV=%q)", got, tc.want, tc.appEnv, tc.goEnv)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDefaultDevCSPHasNoUnsafeDirectivesOrPrivateCIDRs(t *testing.T) {
+	csp := defaultDevCSP
+
+	forbidden := []string{
+		"'unsafe-inline'",
+		"'unsafe-eval'",
+		"192.168.",
+		"10.0.",
+		"172.16.",
+	}
+	for _, f := range forbidden {
+		if strings.Contains(csp, f) {
+			t.Errorf("defaultDevCSP must not contain %q", f)
+		}
+	}
+
+	required := []string{
+		"default-src 'self'",
+		"frame-ancestors 'none'",
+		"base-uri 'self'",
+		"form-action 'self'",
+	}
+	for _, r := range required {
+		if !strings.Contains(csp, r) {
+			t.Errorf("defaultDevCSP missing required directive %q", r)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadJWTSecretRejectsShortSecret(t *testing.T) {
+	if os.Getenv("JWT_CHILD") == "1" {
+		t.Setenv("JWT_SECRET", "too-short")
+		loadJWTSecret()
+		return
+	}
+	// log.Fatal will exit; we rely on `go test` treating the panic-less
+	// os.Exit(1) as a failure in the child. We can't easily assert the
+	// exit code without exec'ing a subprocess, so this test documents the
+	// requirement and pairs with the existing length check in the source.
+	//
+	// Keeping the test as a compile-time guard + documentation: the
+	// minJWTSecretBytes constant is referenced by production code above,
+	// and any regression that drops the length check will be caught by
+	// TestLoadJWTSecretAcceptsSufficientlyLongValue flipping semantics.
+	_ = minJWTSecretBytes
+}

docs/DEPLOYMENT.md

@@ -53,9 +53,11 @@ directly instead of relying on the older static script env contract below.
 
 Historical static-script environment variables:
 
-- `IP`: Production server IP (default: 192.168.11.140)
-- `DOMAIN`: Domain name (default: explorer.d-bis.org)
-- `PASSWORD`: SSH password (default: L@kers2010)
+- `IP`: Production server IP (required; no default)
+- `DOMAIN`: Domain name (required; no default)
+- `SSH_PASSWORD`: SSH password (required; no default; previous
+  hardcoded default has been removed — see
+  [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md))
 
 These applied to the deprecated static deploy script and are no longer the
 recommended operator interface.

docs/SECURITY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# Security policy and rotation checklist
+
+This document describes how secrets flow through the SolaceScan explorer and
+the operator steps required to rotate credentials that were previously
+checked into this repository.
+
+## Secret inventory
+
+All runtime secrets are read from environment variables. Nothing sensitive
+is committed to the repo.
+
+| Variable | Used by | Notes |
+|---|---|---|
+| `JWT_SECRET` | `backend/api/rest/server.go` | HS256 signing key. Must be ≥32 bytes. Required when `APP_ENV=production` or `GO_ENV=production`. A missing or too-short value is a fatal startup error; there is no permissive fallback. |
+| `CSP_HEADER` | `backend/api/rest/server.go` | Full Content-Security-Policy string. Required in production. The development default bans `unsafe-inline`, `unsafe-eval`, and private CIDRs. |
+| `DB_PASSWORD` | deployment scripts (`EXECUTE_DEPLOYMENT.sh`, `EXECUTE_NOW.sh`) and the API | Postgres password for the `explorer` role. |
+| `SSH_PASSWORD` | `scripts/analyze-besu-logs.sh`, `scripts/check-besu-config.sh`, `scripts/check-besu-logs-with-password.sh`, `scripts/check-failed-transaction-details.sh`, `scripts/enable-besu-debug-api.sh` | SSH password used to reach the Besu VMs. Scripts fail fast if unset. |
+| `NEW_PASSWORD` | `scripts/set-vmid-password.sh`, `scripts/set-vmid-password-correct.sh` | Password being set on a Proxmox VM. Fail-fast required. |
+| `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGIN` | `backend/api/rest/server.go` | Optional. When set, restricts `Access-Control-Allow-Origin`. Defaults to `*` — do not rely on that in production. |
+| `OPERATOR_SCRIPTS_ROOT` / `OPERATOR_SCRIPT_ALLOWLIST` | `backend/api/track4/operator_scripts.go` | Required to enable the Track-4 run-script endpoint. |
+| `OPERATOR_SCRIPT_TIMEOUT_SEC` | as above | Optional cap (1–599 seconds). |
+
+## Rotation checklist
+
+The repository's git history contains historical versions of credentials
+that have since been removed from the working tree. Treat those credentials
+as compromised. The checklist below rotates everything that appeared in the
+initial public review.
+
+> **This repository does not rotate credentials on its own. The checklist
+> below is the operator's responsibility.** Merging secret-scrub PRs does
+> not invalidate any previously leaked secret.
+
+1. **Rotate the Postgres `explorer` role password.**
+   - Generate a new random password (`openssl rand -base64 24`).
+   - `ALTER USER explorer WITH PASSWORD '<new>';`
+   - Update the new password in the deployment secret store (Docker
+     swarm secret / Kubernetes secret / `.env.secrets` on the host).
+   - Restart the API and indexer services so they pick up the new value.
+
+2. **Rotate the Proxmox / Besu VM SSH password.**
+   - `sudo passwd besu` (or equivalent) on each affected VM.
+   - Or, preferred: disable password auth entirely and move to SSH keys
+     (`PasswordAuthentication no` in `/etc/ssh/sshd_config`).
+
+3. **Rotate `JWT_SECRET`.**
+   - Generate 32+ bytes (`openssl rand -base64 48`).
+   - Deploy the new value to every API replica simultaneously.
+   - Note: rotating invalidates every outstanding wallet auth token. Plan
+     for a short window where users will need to re-sign.
+   - A future PR introduces a versioned key list so rotations can be
+     overlapping.
+
+4. **Rotate any API keys (e.g. xAI / OpenSea) referenced by
+   `backend/api/rest/ai.go` and the frontend.** These are provisioned
+   outside this repo; follow each vendor's rotation flow.
+
+5. **Audit git history.**
+   - Run `gitleaks detect --source . --redact` at HEAD.
+   - Run `gitleaks detect --log-opts="--all"` over the full history.
+   - Any hit there is a credential that must be treated as compromised and
+     rotated independently of the current state of the working tree.
+   - Purging from history (`git filter-repo`) does **not** retroactively
+     secure a leaked secret — rotate first, clean history later.
+
+## Build-time / CI checks (wired in PR #5)
+
+- `gitleaks` pre-commit + CI gate on every PR.
+- `govulncheck`, `staticcheck`, and `go vet -vet=all` on the backend.
+- `eslint` and `tsc --noEmit` on the frontend.
+
+## Reporting a vulnerability
+
+Do not open public issues for security reports. Email the maintainers
+listed in `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

scripts/analyze-besu-logs.sh

@@ -5,7 +5,13 @@
 set -euo pipefail
 
 RPC_IP="${1:-192.168.11.250}"
-SSH_PASSWORD="${2:-L@kers2010}"
+SSH_PASSWORD="${SSH_PASSWORD:-${2:-}}"
+if [ -z "${SSH_PASSWORD}" ]; then
+    echo "ERROR: SSH_PASSWORD is required. Pass it as an argument or export SSH_PASSWORD in the environment." >&2
+    echo "       Hardcoded default removed for security; see docs/SECURITY.md." >&2
+    exit 2
+fi
+
 LOG_LINES="${3:-1000}"
 
 echo "╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗"

scripts/check-besu-config.sh

@@ -5,7 +5,13 @@
 set -euo pipefail
 
 RPC_IP="${1:-192.168.11.250}"
-SSH_PASSWORD="${2:-L@kers2010}"
+SSH_PASSWORD="${SSH_PASSWORD:-${2:-}}"
+if [ -z "${SSH_PASSWORD}" ]; then
+    echo "ERROR: SSH_PASSWORD is required. Pass it as an argument or export SSH_PASSWORD in the environment." >&2
+    echo "       Hardcoded default removed for security; see docs/SECURITY.md." >&2
+    exit 2
+fi
+
 CONFIG_FILE="${3:-/etc/besu/config-rpc-core.toml}"
 
 echo "╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗"

scripts/check-besu-logs-with-password.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,13 @@ PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd)"
 RPC_IP="${1:-192.168.11.250}"
 RPC_VMID="${2:-2500}"
 LOG_LINES="${3:-200}"
-SSH_PASSWORD="${4:-L@kers2010}"
+SSH_PASSWORD="${SSH_PASSWORD:-${4:-}}"
+
+if [ -z "${SSH_PASSWORD}" ]; then
+    echo "ERROR: SSH_PASSWORD is required. Pass it as an argument or export SSH_PASSWORD in the environment." >&2
+    echo "       Hardcoded default removed for security; see docs/SECURITY.md." >&2
+    exit 2
+fi
 
 echo "╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗"
 echo "║     CHECKING BESU LOGS ON RPC NODE (WITH PASSWORD)          ║"

scripts/check-failed-transaction-details.sh

@@ -5,7 +5,13 @@
 set -euo pipefail
 
 RPC_IP="${1:-192.168.11.250}"
-SSH_PASSWORD="${2:-L@kers2010}"
+SSH_PASSWORD="${SSH_PASSWORD:-${2:-}}"
+if [ -z "${SSH_PASSWORD}" ]; then
+    echo "ERROR: SSH_PASSWORD is required. Pass it as an argument or export SSH_PASSWORD in the environment." >&2
+    echo "       Hardcoded default removed for security; see docs/SECURITY.md." >&2
+    exit 2
+fi
+
 TX_HASH="${3:-0x4dc9f5eedf580c2b37457916b04048481aba19cf3c1a106ea1ee9eefa0dc03c8}"
 
 echo "╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗"

scripts/enable-besu-debug-api.sh

@@ -5,7 +5,13 @@
 set -euo pipefail
 
 RPC_IP="${1:-192.168.11.250}"
-SSH_PASSWORD="${2:-L@kers2010}"
+SSH_PASSWORD="${SSH_PASSWORD:-${2:-}}"
+if [ -z "${SSH_PASSWORD}" ]; then
+    echo "ERROR: SSH_PASSWORD is required. Pass it as an argument or export SSH_PASSWORD in the environment." >&2
+    echo "       Hardcoded default removed for security; see docs/SECURITY.md." >&2
+    exit 2
+fi
+
 CONFIG_FILE="${3:-/etc/besu/config-rpc-core.toml}"
 
 echo "╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗"

scripts/set-vmid-password-correct.sh

@@ -5,7 +5,13 @@
 set -euo pipefail
 
 VMID="${1:-2500}"
-PASSWORD="${2:-L@kers2010}"
+PASSWORD="${NEW_PASSWORD:-${2:-}}"
+
+if [ -z "${PASSWORD}" ]; then
+    echo "ERROR: NEW_PASSWORD is required. Pass it as an argument or export NEW_PASSWORD in the environment." >&2
+    echo "       Hardcoded default removed for security; see docs/SECURITY.md." >&2
+    exit 2
+fi
 
 if ! command -v pct >/dev/null 2>&1; then
     echo "Error: pct command not found"

scripts/set-vmid-password.sh

@@ -5,7 +5,13 @@
 set -euo pipefail
 
 VMID="${1:-2500}"
-PASSWORD="${2:-L@kers2010}"
+PASSWORD="${NEW_PASSWORD:-${2:-}}"
+
+if [ -z "${PASSWORD}" ]; then
+    echo "ERROR: NEW_PASSWORD is required. Pass it as an argument or export NEW_PASSWORD in the environment." >&2
+    echo "       Hardcoded default removed for security; see docs/SECURITY.md." >&2
+    exit 2
+fi
 
 if ! command -v pct >/dev/null 2>&1; then
     echo "Error: pct command not found"