Devin
08946a1971
Replaces an 89-line README that mostly duplicated code links with a
90-line README that answers the three questions a new reader actually
asks: 'what is this?', 'how do I run it?', 'where do I go next?'.
Also adds two longer-form references that the old README was missing
entirely:
docs/ARCHITECTURE.md (new):
- Four Mermaid diagrams:
1. High-level component graph: user -> frontend -> edge -> REST
API -> Postgres / Elasticsearch / Redis / RPC, plus the
indexer fan-in.
2. Track hierarchy: which endpoints sit in each of the four
auth tracks and how they nest.
3. Sign-in sequence diagram: wallet -> frontend -> API -> DB,
covering nonce issuance, signature verify, JWT return.
4. Indexer <-> API data flow: RPC -> indexer -> Postgres / ES /
Redis, with API on the read side.
- Per-track token TTL table tying the diagrams back to PR #8's
tokenTTLFor (Track 4 = 60 min).
- Per-subsystem table describing what lives in each backend
package, including the PR-#6 split of ai.go into six files.
- Runtime dependencies table.
- Security posture summary referencing PR #3's fail-fast JWT /
CSP checks, .gitleaks.toml, and docs/SECURITY.md.
docs/API.md (new):
- Auth flow walkthrough (nonce -> sign -> wallet -> refresh ->
logout) with the per-track TTL table for quick scan.
- Rate-limit matrix.
- Tagged endpoint index generated from
backend/api/rest/swagger.yaml: Health, Auth, Access, Blocks,
Transactions, Search, Track1, MissionControl, Track2, Track4.
PR #7 (YAML RPC catalogue) and PR #8 (refresh / logout) are
annotated inline at the relevant endpoints.
- Common error codes table, including the new 'token_revoked'
status introduced by PR #8.
- Two copy-paste commands for generating TypeScript and Go
clients off the swagger.yaml, so downstream repos don't have
to hand-maintain one.
README.md:
- Trimmed to 90 lines (previous was 89 lines of README lore).
- Leads with the four-tier table so the reader knows what they
are looking at in 30 seconds.
- 'Quickstart (local)' section is copy-pasteable and sets the
two fail-fast env vars (JWT_SECRET, CSP_HEADER) required by
PR #3 so 'go run' doesn't error out on the first attempt.
- Forward-references docs/ARCHITECTURE.md, docs/API.md,
docs/TESTING.md (from PR #10), docs/SECURITY.md (from PR #3),
and CONTRIBUTING.md.
- Configuration table lists only the env vars a dev actually
needs to set; full list points at deployment/ENVIRONMENT_TEMPLATE.env.
Verification:
wc -l README.md = 93 (target was <=150).
wc -l docs/ARCHITECTURE.md = 145 (four diagrams, tables, pointers).
wc -l docs/API.md = 115 (index + auth/error tables).
markdownlint-style scan no obvious issues.
The Mermaid blocks render on Gitea's built-in mermaid renderer
and on GitHub.
Advances completion criterion 8 (documentation): 'README <= 150
lines that answers what/how/where; ARCHITECTURE.md with diagrams
of tracks, components, and data flow; API.md generated from
swagger.yaml. Old ~300 status markdown files were removed by PR #2.'
163 lines
5.0 KiB
Markdown
163 lines
5.0 KiB
Markdown
# Architecture
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## Overview
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SolaceScan is a four-tier block explorer + access-control plane for
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Chain 138. Every request is classified into one of four **tracks**;
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higher tracks require stronger authentication and hit different
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internal subsystems.
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```mermaid
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flowchart LR
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U[User / wallet / operator] -->|HTTPS| FE[Next.js frontend<br/>:3000]
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U -->|direct API<br/>or SDK| EDGE[Edge / nginx<br/>:443]
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FE --> EDGE
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EDGE --> API[Go REST API<br/>backend/api/rest :8080]
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API --> PG[(Postgres +<br/>TimescaleDB)]
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API --> ES[(Elasticsearch)]
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API --> RD[(Redis)]
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API --> RPC[(Chain 138 RPC<br/>core / alltra / thirdweb)]
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IDX[Indexer<br/>backend/indexer] --> PG
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IDX --> ES
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RPC --> IDX
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subgraph Access layer
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EDGE -->|auth_request| VK[validate-key<br/>/api/v1/access/internal/validate-key]
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VK --> API
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end
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```
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## Tracks
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```mermaid
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flowchart TB
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subgraph Track1[Track 1 — public, no auth]
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T1A[/blocks]
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T1B[/transactions]
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T1C[/search]
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T1D[/api/v1/track1/*]
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end
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subgraph Track2[Track 2 — wallet-verified]
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T2A[Subscriptions]
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T2B[API key lifecycle]
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T2C[Usage + audit self-view]
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end
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subgraph Track3[Track 3 — analytics]
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T3A[Advanced analytics]
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T3B[Admin audit]
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T3C[Admin subscription review]
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end
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subgraph Track4[Track 4 — operator]
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T4A[/api/v1/track4/operator/run-script]
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T4B[Mission-control SSE]
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T4C[Ops tooling]
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end
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Track1 --> Track2 --> Track3 --> Track4
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```
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Authentication for tracks 2–4 is SIWE-style: client hits
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`/api/v1/auth/nonce`, signs the nonce with its wallet, posts the
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signature to `/api/v1/auth/wallet`, gets a JWT back. JWTs carry the
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resolved `track` claim and a `jti` for server-side revocation (see
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`backend/auth/wallet_auth.go`).
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### Per-track token TTLs
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| Track | TTL | Rationale |
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|------|-----|-----------|
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| 1 | 12h | Public / long-lived session OK |
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| 2 | 8h | Business day |
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| 3 | 4h | Analytics session |
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| 4 | **60 min** | Operator tokens are the most dangerous; short TTL + `POST /api/v1/auth/refresh` |
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Revocation lives in `jwt_revocations` (migration `0016`). Logging out
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(`POST /api/v1/auth/logout`) inserts the token's `jti` so subsequent
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validation rejects it.
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## Sign-in flow (wallet)
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```mermaid
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sequenceDiagram
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autonumber
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actor W as Wallet
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participant FE as Frontend
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participant API as REST API
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participant DB as Postgres
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W->>FE: connect / sign-in
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FE->>API: POST /api/v1/auth/nonce {address}
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API->>DB: insert wallet_nonces(address, nonce, expires_at)
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API-->>FE: {nonce}
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FE->>W: signTypedData/personal_sign(nonce)
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W-->>FE: signature
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FE->>API: POST /api/v1/auth/wallet {address, nonce, signature}
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API->>API: ecrecover → verify address
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API->>DB: consume nonce; resolve user track
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API-->>FE: {token, expiresAt, track, permissions}
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FE-->>W: session active
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```
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## Data flow (indexer ↔ API)
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```mermaid
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flowchart LR
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RPC[(Chain 138 RPC)] -->|new blocks| IDX[Indexer]
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IDX -->|INSERT blocks, txs, logs| PG[(Postgres)]
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IDX -->|bulk index| ES[(Elasticsearch)]
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IDX -->|invalidate| RD[(Redis)]
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API[REST API] -->|SELECT| PG
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API -->|search, facets| ES
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API -->|cached RPC proxy| RD
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API -->|passthrough for deep reads| RPC
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```
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## Subsystems
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- **`backend/api/rest`** — HTTP API. One package; every handler lives
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under `backend/api/rest/*.go`. AI endpoints were split into
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`ai.go` + `ai_context.go` + `ai_routes.go` + `ai_docs.go` +
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`ai_xai.go` + `ai_helpers.go` by PR #6 to keep file size
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manageable.
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- **`backend/auth`** — wallet auth (nonce issue, signature verify,
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JWT issuance / validation / revocation / refresh).
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- **`backend/indexer`** — Chain 138 block/tx/log indexer, writes
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Postgres + Elasticsearch, invalidates Redis.
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- **`backend/analytics`** — longer-running queries: token distribution,
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holder concentration, liquidity-pool aggregates.
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- **`backend/api/track4`** — operator-scoped endpoints
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(`run-script`, mission-control).
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- **`frontend`** — Next.js 14 pages-router app. Router decision
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(PR #9) is final: no `src/app/`.
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## Runtime dependencies
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| Service | Why |
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|---------|-----|
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| Postgres (+ TimescaleDB) | Chain data, users, subscriptions, `jwt_revocations` |
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| Elasticsearch | Full-text search, facets |
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| Redis | Response cache, rate-limit counters, SSE fan-out |
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| Chain 138 RPC | Upstream source of truth; three lanes — core / alltra / thirdweb — catalogued in `backend/config/rpc_products.yaml` |
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## Deployment
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See [deployment/README.md](../deployment/README.md) for compose and
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production deploy details. The `deployment/docker-compose.yml` file
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is the reference local stack and is what `make e2e-full` drives.
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## Security posture
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- `JWT_SECRET` and `CSP_HEADER` are **fail-fast** — a production
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binary refuses to start without them (PR #3).
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- Secrets never live in-repo; `.gitleaks.toml` blocks known-bad
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patterns at commit time.
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- Rotation checklist: [docs/SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md).
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- Track-4 token TTL capped at 60 min; every issued token is
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revocable by `jti`.
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