Add ai-mcp-pmm-controller submodule (5701 MCP hub); Appendix F, push+pin, EXECUTION_ARMED, hygiene
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defiQUG
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[submodule "fireblocks-integration"]
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path = fireblocks-integration
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url = https://gitea.d-bis.org/d-bis/fireblocks-integration.git
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[submodule "cross-chain-pmm-lps"]
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path = cross-chain-pmm-lps
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url = https://gitea.d-bis.org/d-bis/cross-chain-pmm-lps.git
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[submodule "ai-mcp-pmm-controller"]
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path = ai-mcp-pmm-controller
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url = https://gitea.d-bis.org/d-bis/ai-mcp-pmm-controller.git
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1
ai-mcp-pmm-controller
Submodule
1
ai-mcp-pmm-controller
Submodule
Submodule ai-mcp-pmm-controller added at bb19a9f59b
1
cross-chain-pmm-lps
Submodule
1
cross-chain-pmm-lps
Submodule
Submodule cross-chain-pmm-lps added at c2f4fa75f1
550
docs/02-architecture/AI_AGENTS_57XX_DEPLOYMENT_PLAN.md
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docs/02-architecture/AI_AGENTS_57XX_DEPLOYMENT_PLAN.md
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# AI / Agents 57xx Deployment Plan
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**Last Updated:** 2026-02-26
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**Status:** Active
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**VMID band:** 5700–5999 (see [VMID_ALLOCATION_FINAL.md](VMID_ALLOCATION_FINAL.md))
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---
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## Overview
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This plan aligns with the repo’s canonical allocation:
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- **3000–3003** = RPC/monitor-adjacent (ml110 / ccip-monitor-1..4); keep as-is.
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- **5400–5599** = CCIP DON (Commit/Execute/RMN + admin/monitor/relay).
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- **5700–5999** = AI / Agents / Dev (model serving, MCP, agent runtimes).
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Target setup: **Ubuntu/Debian VMs, Docker-based services.** If your OS differs, only the package manager and service commands change; the structure stays the same. The **5701 MCP hub** implementation (read-only + risk scoring) lives in the **ai-mcp-pmm-controller** submodule; see Appendix F.
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---
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## 1) QEMU Guest Agent on VMID 3000–3003 (inside the VMs)
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Use when you want Proxmox to see guest info (IP, agent ping) for 3000–3003.
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**Debian/Ubuntu (inside each container):**
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```bash
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sudo apt update
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sudo apt install -y qemu-guest-agent
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sudo systemctl enable --now qemu-guest-agent
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```
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**Verify from Proxmox host (QEMU VMs only; LXC uses `pct exec`, not `qm agent`):**
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```bash
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# For QEMU/KVM VMs:
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qm agent 3000 ping
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qm agent 3001 ping
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qm agent 3002 ping
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qm agent 3003 ping
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```
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*Note:* If 3000–3003 are **LXC** containers, use `pct exec <vmid> -- systemctl status qemu-guest-agent` (or skip agent; LXC doesn’t use QEMU guest agent the same way).
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---
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## 2) Stand up AI stack in the 57xx range (recommended layout)
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| VMID | Role | Purpose |
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|------|------|---------|
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| **5701** | MCP Hub | DODO PMM tool server + policy guardrails + signer boundary (keys stay here, not on inference VM) |
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| **5702** | Inference | HF model server (e.g. TGI or llama.cpp server) |
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| **5703** | Agent Worker | Orchestration + decisioning; talks to 5702 (inference) and 5701 (MCP) |
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| **5704** | Memory/State (optional) | Postgres / Redis / vector DB for agent state and tool-call logs |
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### Ports & network assumptions
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Choose ports per VM; keep all services **internal-only** (no public exposure). Example:
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| VMID | Service | Port (example) | Allowed callers |
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|------|---------|----------------|-----------------|
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| 5701 | MCP Hub | `tcp/3000` | 5702, 5703 only |
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| 5702 | Inference | `tcp/8000` | 5703 only |
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| 5704 | Postgres | `tcp/5432` | 5701, 5703 (internal-only) |
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| 5704 | Redis | `tcp/6379` | 5701, 5703 (internal-only) |
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Firewall/ACL: allowlist only the VMIDs above; no ingress from outside the 57xx band unless explicitly required.
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---
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## 3) VM 5701 — MCP Hub (skeleton)
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**Principle:** Signing keys and policy live here; inference VM (5702) stays keyless.
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**Expose MCP tools (examples):**
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- `dodo.get_pool_state`
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- `dodo.quote_add_liquidity`
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- `dodo.add_liquidity`
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- `dodo.remove_liquidity`
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- `dodo.risk_check` (slippage, max notional, cooldown, allowlist)
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**Policy defaults (safe):**
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- Max trade/liquidity move per action
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- Max daily notional
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- Pool allowlist only
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- Circuit breaker on oracle deviation / pool illiquidity
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### Hardening checklist (5701)
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Before enabling execution or signing on the MCP hub, confirm:
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- [ ] **Pool allowlist** — only allowlisted pools are exposed to tools
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- [ ] **Max slippage** — cap enforced per quote/add/remove liquidity
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- [ ] **Max notional per tx** — hard limit per single transaction
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- [ ] **Max notional per day** — daily aggregate cap
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- [ ] **Cooldown window** — minimum time between liquidity moves (e.g. per pool or global)
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- [ ] **Circuit breaker triggers** — e.g. oracle deviation threshold, pool illiquidity, or manual pause
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- [ ] **Keys only on 5701** — signing keys never on inference VM (5702) or agent worker (5703)
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---
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## 4) VM 5702 — HF inference
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Pick one stack:
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- **TGI (text-generation-inference)** — batteries-included, good for GPU.
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- **llama.cpp server** — CPU-friendly, GGUF, efficient.
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---
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## 5) VM 5703 — Agent worker
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- Calls inference locally (5702).
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- Calls MCP server (5701) for DODO PMM tools and policy.
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- Logs actions and tool calls to 5704 (or to an existing state VM if you prefer).
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---
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## 6) DODO PMM “agent” — read-only vs execution
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| Mode | Description |
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|------|-------------|
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| **Read-only first (recommended)** | MCP server exposes state + quotes only; agent produces *proposed* actions. No signing or on-chain tx from the agent. |
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| **Execution enabled** | MCP includes signing + on-chain tx submission behind policy caps (rate limits, slippage caps, allowlisted pools). |
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Recommendation: start **read-only**; enable execution once monitoring and policy are stable.
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---
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## Design decisions (before DODO implementation)
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These govern how the MCP hub implements tools and policy. Risk scoring and constraints should exist in **read-only** mode so the agent learns under the same rules it will later execute with.
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### 1) Policy architecture (enforced before any write tool)
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The MCP hub must enforce, in order:
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- **Pool allowlist** — contract addresses (hardcoded or DB-driven); only allowlisted pools are exposed.
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- **Max slippage** — e.g. 0.5–1%.
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- **Max single-tx notional**
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- **Max daily notional**
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- **Cooldown window** per pool (minimum time between liquidity moves).
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- **Oracle deviation threshold** — circuit breaker when oracle vs mid price exceeds limit.
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- **Gas cap**
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- **Circuit breaker state** — persisted in Redis or Postgres; can pause all write tools.
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These checks run **before** any write tool; in read-only mode, risk scoring uses the same constraints for proposed actions and drift analysis.
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### 2) Data model for `dodo.get_pool_state`
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The agent must **never** see raw contract structs. MCP normalizes pool state into a single schema, e.g.:
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```json
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{
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"pool_address": "...",
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"chain": "arbitrum",
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"base_token": "...",
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"quote_token": "...",
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"mid_price": 1.2345,
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"oracle_price": 1.2288,
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"inventory_ratio": 0.62,
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"liquidity_base": 1250000,
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"liquidity_quote": 980000,
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"k": 0.8,
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"fee_rate": 0.003,
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"timestamp": 1700000000
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}
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```
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All MCP tool responses (state, quotes, risk) use this or an extended version; no raw ABI structs are exposed to the agent.
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### 3) Activation sequence
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- **Phase 1:** Docker Compose + read-only first — build risk scoring, simulate proposed actions, record agent decision drift, evaluate behavior with zero capital exposure.
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- **Phase 2:** Set `ALLOW_WRITE=true`, enable signed tx submission, keep caps very low at first.
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When ready to implement: reply with **“Use Docker Compose + read-only first + chain = <Arbitrum|BSC|Ethereum>”** to get concrete MCP implementation (web3/ethers, DODO ABI pattern, `dodo.get_pool_state`, `dodo.risk_check`, policy guardrails, structured payload schema, simulation stub).
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---
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## Repo search commands (VMID / buffer usage)
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From repo root, to find any remaining references to the old buffer name or AI/Agents start:
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```bash
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# Fast search
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grep -RIn --exclude-dir=.git "VMID_BUFFER_START" .
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# Variants
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grep -RIn --exclude-dir=.git "BUFFER_START\|VMID_AI_AGENTS_START" .
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```
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If scripts still use `VMID_BUFFER_START`, keep the alias in config and migrate to `VMID_AI_AGENTS_START` over time.
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---
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## Appendix A — Common prerequisites (all 57xx VMs)
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Assumes Ubuntu/Debian, Docker Engine + Compose plugin. Internal network ACLs enforce 57xx-only reachability per the Ports table above. In Appendices C–E, `5701`/`5702`/`5704` are used as hostnames in URLs; replace with your VM hostnames or IPs if your network does not resolve numeric hostnames.
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```bash
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sudo apt update
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sudo apt install -y ca-certificates curl gnupg ufw
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# Docker
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curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sudo sh
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sudo usermod -aG docker $USER
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# Log out/in once, or:
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newgrp docker
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# Standard directories
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sudo mkdir -p /opt/ai/{mcp,inference,agent,state}/{config,data,logs}
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sudo chown -R $USER:$USER /opt/ai
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```
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Health check helpers:
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```bash
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docker ps
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docker logs --tail=100 <container>
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curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:3000/health || true
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```
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---
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## Appendix B — VM 5704 (Memory/State): Postgres + Redis (+ optional Qdrant)
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Create: `/opt/ai/state/docker-compose.yml`
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```yaml
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services:
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postgres:
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image: postgres:16
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container_name: ai-state-postgres
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environment:
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POSTGRES_DB: ai
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POSTGRES_USER: ai
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POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}
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volumes:
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- /opt/ai/state/data/postgres:/var/lib/postgresql/data
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ports:
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- "5432:5432"
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restart: unless-stopped
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healthcheck:
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test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U ai -d ai"]
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interval: 10s
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timeout: 5s
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retries: 10
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redis:
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image: redis:7
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container_name: ai-state-redis
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command: ["redis-server", "--appendonly", "yes", "--save", "60", "1"]
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volumes:
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- /opt/ai/state/data/redis:/data
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ports:
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- "6379:6379"
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restart: unless-stopped
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healthcheck:
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test: ["CMD", "redis-cli", "PING"]
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interval: 10s
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timeout: 3s
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retries: 10
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# Optional vector DB (uncomment if needed)
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# qdrant:
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# image: qdrant/qdrant:latest
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# container_name: ai-state-qdrant
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# volumes:
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# - /opt/ai/state/data/qdrant:/qdrant/storage
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# ports:
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# - "6333:6333"
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# restart: unless-stopped
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```
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Create: `/opt/ai/state/.env`
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```bash
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POSTGRES_PASSWORD=change_me_strong
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```
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Run:
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```bash
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cd /opt/ai/state
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docker compose up -d
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docker compose ps
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```
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---
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## Appendix C — VM 5701 (MCP Hub): MCP server + policy stub
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Provides: `/health` endpoint; place to implement MCP tools (`dodo.get_pool_state`, `dodo.risk_check`, etc.); **policy gate** stub (deny-by-default for write actions until enabled).
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### 1) MCP server skeleton
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`/opt/ai/mcp/config/server.py`
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```python
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from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException
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from pydantic import BaseModel
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import os
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app = FastAPI(title="AI MCP Hub", version="1.0")
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ALLOW_WRITE = os.getenv("ALLOW_WRITE", "false").lower() == "true"
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class ToolCall(BaseModel):
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tool: str
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params: dict = {}
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@app.get("/health")
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def health():
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return {"ok": True}
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@app.post("/mcp/call")
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def mcp_call(call: ToolCall):
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# Hard gate: deny all write tools unless explicitly enabled
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write_tools_prefixes = ("dodo.add_", "dodo.remove_", "dodo.execute_", "dodo.rebalance_")
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if call.tool.startswith(write_tools_prefixes) and not ALLOW_WRITE:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Write tools disabled (read-only mode).")
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# TODO: implement tool routing:
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# - dodo.get_pool_state
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# - dodo.quote_add_liquidity
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# - dodo.risk_check
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# - etc.
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return {"tool": call.tool, "result": {"stub": True, "params": call.params}}
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```
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### 2) Compose for MCP Hub
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`/opt/ai/mcp/docker-compose.yml`
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```yaml
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services:
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mcp:
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image: python:3.11-slim
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container_name: ai-mcp-prod
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working_dir: /app
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volumes:
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- /opt/ai/mcp/config:/app
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- /opt/ai/mcp/logs:/logs
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environment:
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ALLOW_WRITE: "false"
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# Add RPC URLs and chain config when wiring DODO:
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# CHAIN: "arbitrum"
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# RPC_URL: "http://..."
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command: >
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sh -lc "pip install --no-cache-dir fastapi uvicorn pydantic &&
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uvicorn server:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 3000"
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ports:
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- "3000:3000"
|
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restart: unless-stopped
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healthcheck:
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test: ["CMD-SHELL", "python -c \"import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen('http://127.0.0.1:3000/health').read()\""]
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interval: 10s
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timeout: 5s
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retries: 10
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```
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Run:
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```bash
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cd /opt/ai/mcp
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docker compose up -d
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curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:3000/health
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```
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||||
**When you enable execution:** set `ALLOW_WRITE=true` **only after** policy checks, allowlist, and limits are implemented (see Hardening checklist).
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||||
---
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||||
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||||
## Appendix D — VM 5702 (Inference): TGI or llama.cpp (CPU-friendly)
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||||
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||||
### Option 1: llama.cpp server (CPU default)
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||||
|
||||
`/opt/ai/inference/docker-compose.yml`
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
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services:
|
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llama:
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image: ghcr.io/ggerganov/llama.cpp:server
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container_name: ai-inf-prod
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- /opt/ai/inference/data/models:/models
|
||||
command: >
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-m /models/model.gguf
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--host 0.0.0.0 --port 8000
|
||||
--n-gpu-layers 0
|
||||
--ctx-size 4096
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||||
ports:
|
||||
- "8000:8000"
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||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
```
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||||
|
||||
Put your GGUF at: `/opt/ai/inference/data/models/model.gguf`
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||||
|
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Run:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
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cd /opt/ai/inference
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||||
docker compose up -d
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||||
```
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||||
### Option 2: TGI
|
||||
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||||
Use if you have GPU and want HF-native serving; omit if CPU-only.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Appendix E — VM 5703 (Agent Worker): calls inference + MCP + logs to state
|
||||
|
||||
`/opt/ai/agent/config/agent.py`
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
import os, time, requests
|
||||
from datetime import datetime
|
||||
|
||||
MCP_URL = os.getenv("MCP_URL", "http://5701:3000/mcp/call")
|
||||
INF_URL = os.getenv("INF_URL", "http://5702:8000") # llama.cpp default
|
||||
MODE = os.getenv("MODE", "read-only")
|
||||
|
||||
def call_mcp(tool, params=None):
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r = requests.post(MCP_URL, json={"tool": tool, "params": params or {}}, timeout=30)
|
||||
r.raise_for_status()
|
||||
return r.json()
|
||||
|
||||
def main():
|
||||
print(f"[{datetime.utcnow().isoformat()}] agent starting; MODE={MODE}")
|
||||
while True:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
state = call_mcp("dodo.get_pool_state", {"pool": "POOL_ADDRESS_HERE"})
|
||||
risk = call_mcp("dodo.risk_check", {"state": state})
|
||||
print("state:", state)
|
||||
print("risk:", risk)
|
||||
except Exception as e:
|
||||
print("error:", e)
|
||||
time.sleep(30)
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
main()
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`/opt/ai/agent/docker-compose.yml`
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
services:
|
||||
agent:
|
||||
image: python:3.11-slim
|
||||
container_name: ai-agent-prod
|
||||
working_dir: /app
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- /opt/ai/agent/config:/app
|
||||
- /opt/ai/agent/logs:/logs
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
MCP_URL: "http://5701:3000/mcp/call"
|
||||
INF_URL: "http://5702:8000"
|
||||
MODE: "read-only"
|
||||
# PG_DSN: "postgresql://ai:...@5704:5432/ai"
|
||||
# REDIS_URL: "redis://5704:6379/0"
|
||||
command: >
|
||||
sh -lc "pip install --no-cache-dir requests &&
|
||||
python agent.py"
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Run:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
cd /opt/ai/agent
|
||||
docker compose up -d
|
||||
docker logs -f ai-agent-prod
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Appendix F — 5701 real MCP implementation (read-only + risk scoring)
|
||||
|
||||
The **canonical implementation** lives in the **ai-mcp-pmm-controller** submodule (repo root):
|
||||
|
||||
- **config/allowlist.json** — Single source of truth: chain, pool addresses, base/quote tokens, profile name, limits (slippage bps, notional caps, cooldown, oracle deviation, gas cap).
|
||||
- **config/pool_profiles.json** — Maps profile names (e.g. `dodo_pmm_v2_like`) to contract method names so the same server code works across DODO variants.
|
||||
- **config/abis/erc20.json** — Minimal ERC20 ABI for symbol/decimals/balance.
|
||||
- **config/server.py** — FastAPI MCP hub: `dodo.get_pool_state`, `dodo.risk_check`, `dodo.simulate_action`; write-tool gate (**both** `ALLOW_WRITE` and `EXECUTION_ARMED`); normalized pool state (no raw structs).
|
||||
- **docker-compose.yml** — Runs server with `web3`, env: `ALLOW_WRITE`, `EXECUTION_ARMED`, `CHAIN`, `RPC_URL`, paths to allowlist/profiles/ERC20 ABI; optional `--env-file .env`; non-root `user: "1000:1000"`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Deploy on VM 5701:** Clone proxmox with `--recurse-submodules` (or copy `ai-mcp-pmm-controller/` to the VM). Edit `config/allowlist.json` (replace `0xPOOL_ADDRESS_HERE`, base/quote tokens), set `RPC_URL` in compose or `.env`, then from the submodule root: `mkdir -p logs && docker compose up -d`. For `/opt/ai/mcp` layout, copy `config/` to `/opt/ai/mcp/config` and use the submodule’s compose (mount `config` as `/app`).
|
||||
|
||||
**Chain-agnostic:** Switch chain by changing `CHAIN` and `RPC_URL` and updating the allowlist; adjust `pool_profiles.json` if a pool uses different method names. To fill `inventory_ratio` / `liquidity_base` / `liquidity_quote`, add the correct DODO pool ABI/profile for your target pool (see Design decisions above).
|
||||
|
||||
**Execution gates:** Write tools require **both** `ALLOW_WRITE=true` and `EXECUTION_ARMED=true` (defaults false). Prevents accidental enable with a single flip.
|
||||
|
||||
**Production hygiene (submodule):** `.gitignore` excludes `.env`, `config/allowlist.local.json`, `*.log`, `logs/`. Use `.env` for RPC_URL/CHAIN/gates (don’t bake secrets in git). Container runs as `user: "1000:1000"`; ensure mounted dirs are writable by that UID.
|
||||
|
||||
### Push + pin (no surprises)
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Submodule:** From workstation, `cd ai-mcp-pmm-controller && git push origin main`.
|
||||
2. **Parent:** `git add .gitmodules ai-mcp-pmm-controller docs/... && git commit -m "..." && git push`. Sanity check: parent commit should show the submodule as a **gitlink** (SHA pointer), not a large file add.
|
||||
3. **VM 5701:** `git clone --recurse-submodules <PROXMOX_REPO_URL> /opt/proxmox`, then deploy from `ai-mcp-pmm-controller/` per submodule README.
|
||||
|
||||
### Completing liquidity fields and pool detection
|
||||
|
||||
- **`dodo.identify_pool_interface` (future):** Feature-detect which DODO pool interface a contract uses (e.g. `getVaultReserve()` / `getBaseReserve()` / `getPMMState()`), return a `detected_profile` for the allowlist so new pools are plug-and-play.
|
||||
- **To implement precisely (no trial-and-error):** Provide **one Arbitrum pool contract address** or the exact **DODO pool type/version** (e.g. DODO V2 PMM, DPP, DSP, DVM). Then: ABI entries for reserves/state, `pool_profiles.json` additions, and `server.py` changes to populate `liquidity_base`, `liquidity_quote`, `inventory_ratio`.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Network ACL notes (allowlist by VMID)
|
||||
|
||||
At minimum:
|
||||
|
||||
- **5703 → 5702:8000** (agent → inference)
|
||||
- **5703 → 5701:3000** (agent → MCP)
|
||||
- **5701, 5703 → 5704:5432, 6379** (MCP/agent → state)
|
||||
- Deny everything else by default.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Healthcheck commands (paste-ready)
|
||||
|
||||
**MCP:**
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
curl -fsS http://5701:3000/health
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Inference:**
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
curl -fsS http://5702:8000/health || true
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
(llama.cpp server may not expose `/health`; use a request to its root if needed.)
|
||||
|
||||
**State:**
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
pg_isready -h 5704 -U ai -d ai
|
||||
redis-cli -h 5704 ping
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
**Owner:** Architecture
|
||||
**Review cadence:** Quarterly or upon new VMID band creation
|
||||
**Change control:** PR required; update Version + Last Updated
|
||||
@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@
|
||||
# Submodule Relationship Map
|
||||
|
||||
**Last Updated:** 2026-02-16
|
||||
**Last Updated:** 2026-02-26
|
||||
**Status:** 🟢 Active Master Reference
|
||||
**Purpose:** Document all submodules and their relationships
|
||||
**Source of truth:** Root [.gitmodules](../../.gitmodules) — reconciled 2026-02-16.
|
||||
**Source of truth:** Root [.gitmodules](../../.gitmodules) — reconciled 2026-02-26.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Submodule Overview
|
||||
|
||||
**Root-level submodules (per .gitmodules):** 15
|
||||
**Root-level submodules (per .gitmodules):** 17
|
||||
**Nested (arromis-monorepo):** 5
|
||||
**Total (including nested):** 19
|
||||
**Total (including nested):** 20
|
||||
|
||||
**Note:** Root README and PROJECT_STRUCTURE also reference `smom-dbis-138-proxmox/` (deployment scripts). That directory may exist as a sibling or legacy clone; the **git submodule** is `smom-dbis-138` (path `smom-dbis-138/`). See [Submodule Issues & Notes](#submodule-issues--notes).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@
|
||||
| **metamask-integration** | `metamask-integration/` | git@github.com:Defi-Oracle-Meta-Blockchain/metamask-integration.git | MetaMask integration | smom-dbis-138 |
|
||||
| **fireblocks-integration** | `fireblocks-integration/` | https://gitea.d-bis.org/d-bis/fireblocks-integration.git | Fireblocks Web3 (Chain 138 RPC, docs) | smom-dbis-138 (RPC) |
|
||||
| **alltra-lifi-settlement** | `alltra-lifi-settlement/` | https://github.com/bis-innovations/LiFi_Pay_Alltra_Integration_Submodule.git | LiFi/Alltra settlement | None |
|
||||
| **cross-chain-pmm-lps** | `cross-chain-pmm-lps/` | https://gitea.d-bis.org/d-bis/cross-chain-pmm-lps.git | cW* M1 public-chain single-sided PMM stabilization mesh (bot, pool topology, peg bands, oracles) | smom-dbis-138 / token-mapping (reference) |
|
||||
| **ai-mcp-pmm-controller** | `ai-mcp-pmm-controller/` | https://gitea.d-bis.org/d-bis/ai-mcp-pmm-controller.git | 5701 MCP hub for DODO PMM (read-only + risk scoring, pool allowlist, policy gate) | See [AI_AGENTS_57XX_DEPLOYMENT_PLAN.md](../02-architecture/AI_AGENTS_57XX_DEPLOYMENT_PLAN.md) Appendix F |
|
||||
| **OMNIS** | `OMNIS/` | https://github.com/Defi-Oracle-Tooling/OMNIS.git | OMNIS platform | None |
|
||||
|
||||
### Business Systems
|
||||
@@ -50,7 +52,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
| Submodule | Path | Repository | Purpose | Dependencies |
|
||||
|-----------|------|------------|---------|--------------|
|
||||
| **gru-docs** | `gru-docs/` | https://github.com/Defi-Oracle-Tooling/GRU-Official-Docs-Monetary-Policies.git | GRU documentation | None |
|
||||
| **gru-docs** | `gru-docs/` | https://github.com/Defi-Oracle-Tooling/GRU-Official-Docs-Monetary-Policies.git | GRU documentation (monetary policy, Diamond/contracts, compliance) | None. Same repo is often cloned standalone as **GRU-Official-Docs-Monetary-Policies** (e.g. `~/projects/GRU-Official-Docs-Monetary-Policies`). |
|
||||
|
||||
### ARROMIS Organization
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -93,6 +95,7 @@ proxmox (root)
|
||||
│ ├── metamask-integration (depends on: smom-dbis-138)
|
||||
│ └── fireblocks-integration (depends on: smom-dbis-138 RPC)
|
||||
├── alltra-lifi-settlement (standalone)
|
||||
├── cross-chain-pmm-lps (standalone)
|
||||
├── dbis_core (standalone)
|
||||
│ └── the-order (optional dependency: dbis_core)
|
||||
├── OMNIS (standalone)
|
||||
@@ -127,6 +130,7 @@ proxmox (root)
|
||||
|
||||
### Notes
|
||||
|
||||
- **cross-chain-pmm-lps:** cW* M1 public-chain PMM stabilization mesh; repo: https://gitea.d-bis.org/d-bis/cross-chain-pmm-lps.git
|
||||
- **explorer-monorepo:** URL in .gitmodules is `https://github.com/Order-of-Hospitallers/chain-138-explorer.git` (fixed; was previously documented as local path).
|
||||
- **arromis-monorepo:** Contains 5 nested submodules (migrated from root ARROMIS/ directory).
|
||||
- **pr-workspace:** Contains 2 submodules for PR workspace functionality.
|
||||
@@ -185,7 +189,7 @@ git commit -m "Update arromis-monorepo submodules"
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
**Last Updated:** 2026-02-16
|
||||
**Last Updated:** 2026-02-26
|
||||
**Maintainer:** System Administrator
|
||||
**Update Frequency:** On submodule additions/removals
|
||||
**Current Status:** ✅ Reconciled with .gitmodules (14 root + 5 nested); explorer URL and alltra-lifi-settlement added; smom-dbis-138 vs -proxmox noted.
|
||||
**Current Status:** ✅ Reconciled with .gitmodules (16 root + 5 nested); cross-chain-pmm-lps submodule (Gitea) added; explorer URL and alltra-lifi-settlement added; smom-dbis-138 vs -proxmox noted.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user